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ATTORNEY ADVERTISING-CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
ADVERTISE IN PRINT MEDIA, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
In the spring of 1982, Phillip Q. Zauderer, an attorney practicing
in Columbus, Ohio, placed an advertisement in thirty-six Ohio newspa-
pers. The advertisement publicized his willingness to represent women
who had suffered injuries resulting from their use of a contraceptive
device known as the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device. It also featured
a line drawing of the Dalkon Shield accompanied by the question,
"DID YOU USE THIS IUD?" The ad concluded with the name of
Zauderer's law firm, its address, and a phone number the reader might
call for free information. The firm received well over 200 inquiries from
this advertisement and initiated lawsuits on behalf of 106 women.
The ad, however, also prompted the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
for the state of Ohio to file a complaint with the Board of Commission-
ers .on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio, alleg-
ing a number of disciplinary violations. Principally, the complaint al-
leged that by running the advertisement and accepting the resulting
employment, Zauderer had violated the following Disciplinary Rules
from the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility: DR 2-101(B),
prohibiting the use of illustrations in ads run by attorneys, requiring
that attorney advertisements be "dignified," and limiting the informa-
tion contained in such advertisements to a list of twenty items;1 DR 2-
103(A), prohibiting an attorney from "recommend[ing] employment,
as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a non-
lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a law-
yer;" 2 and DR 2-104(A), providing (with certain exceptions not appli-
cable in this case) that "[a] lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to
a layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not
accept employment resulting from such advice."' The complaint also
alleged that the ad violated the disclosure requirements of DR 2-
101 (B)(15)." Moreover, it alleged that the ad's failure to inform clients
I. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1982).
2. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1982).
3. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A) (1982). Virtually all states
have a similar provision. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2294-95
& nn. 2-4 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4. See OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B)(15) (1982), which per-
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that they would be liable for costs (as opposed to legal fees), even if
their claims were unsuccessful, rendered the advertisement "deceptive"
in violation of DR 2-101(A).5 The complaint did not allege that the
advertisement was false or deceptive in any other respect. Indeed, the
Office of Disciplinary Counsel stipulated that the information and ad-
vice regarding Dalkon Shield litigation was not false, fraudulent, mis-
leading, or deceptive, and that the drawing was an accurate representa-
tion of the Dalkon Shield. Notwithstanding the nonmisleading nature
of this advertising, the Office argued that the disciplinary rules in ques-
tion were permissible restrictions on the constitutional right to adver-
tise, even as applied to Zauderer.
A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Disci-
pline found that each of the allegations in the complaint was supported
by the evidence. The panel made these findings despite the testimony of
expert witnesses that unfettered advertising by attorneys was economi-
cally beneficial to society. More specifically, these experts testified that
the Dalkon Shield ad was socially valuable in informing the public of
both the potential hazards of this intrauterine device and their corre-
sponding legal rights. Indeed, two of the women who had responded to
the ad testified that they would not have learned of their legal claims
had it not been for Zauderer's advertisement. The Ohio Supreme Court
adopted the panel's findings and agreed with the panel that the applica-
tion of Ohio's disciplinary rules to Zauderer's advertisement did not
offend the first amendment.' The Ohio court pointed out that the
United States Supreme Court's decisions in Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona 7 and In re R.M.J.8 permitted regulations designed to prevent the
use of deceptive advertising, and that R.M.J. had recognized that even
nondeceptive advertising might be restricted if the restriction was nar-
rowly designed to meet a substantial state interest." The Ohio Supreme
Court held that, for purposes of clarity, ads mentioning contingent fees
should specifically express what those fees are.10 The Ohio court also
found it "reasonable" to prohibit a lawyer from giving legal advice in a
specific area and. recommending himself for any resulting employ-
mits an attorney to advertise "[c]ontingent fee rates ... provided that the statement discloses
whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of court costs and expenses."
5. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A) (1982).
6. Disciplinary Counsel v. Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d 44, 461 N.E.2d 883 (1984).
7. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
8. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
9. Disciplinary Counsel v. Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d 44, 47-48, 461 N.E.2d 883, 886 (1984).
10. Id. at 48, 461 N.E.2d at 886.
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ment. 11 Thus, the court held that states may restrict attorneys from
accepting employment from such unsolicited advice, although it did not
specifically identify the interests served by these restrictions.12 The
court also noted that restrictions are permissible if the advertising is
misleading per se, or may be misleading in its reach and interpreta-
tion. 3 Apparently this formed the court's basis for disallowing the use
of illustrations, but, here again, the court did not give its reasoning. In
accordance with these views, the Ohio court accepted and implemented
the panel's recommendation that Zauderer's conduct warranted a pub-
lic reprimand."
The United States Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The Supreme Court opinion, authored by Justice White and
joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, held that Zauderer was
properly disciplined for the failure to disclose the client's potential lia-
bility for costs as opposed to legal fees. Justice O'Connor, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, concurred in this view in a
separate opinion. However, a majority of the Court disapproved of the
Ohio court's decision to reprimand Zauderer for the use of a non-de-
ceptive illustration and for soliciting or accepting legal employment
through an advertisement containing information or advice regarding a
specific legal problem. The separate opinion of Justice Brennan, joined
by Justice Marshall, concurred with the majority of the Court on these
issues. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265
(1985).15
The Supreme Court in Zauderer balanced an attorney's constitu-
tional right to advertise against a state's power to regulate the legal
profession. The birth of the commercial speech doctrine has provided a
II. Id. at 48, 461 N.E.2d at 887.
12. Id. at 48-49, 461 N.E.2d at 886-87.
13. Id. at 47, 461 N.E.2d at 886 (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 350 (1977) and R.M.J., 455 U.S.
at 192 (1982)).
14. 10 Ohio St. 3d at 49, 461 N.E.2d at 887.
15. Also at issue in the case but not germane to this casenote, was a D.W.1. advertisement
found deceptive in violation of DR 2-101(A). The United States Supreme Court rejected
Zauderer's argument that the discrepancy between the theory asserted by the Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel in its complaint and the theory ultimately relied on by the Board and the Ohio
Supreme Court denied him procedural due process. The Court reasoned that since the Board is
only empowered to make recommendations to the Ohio Supreme Court, the fact that it chose to
base its recommendation on a different theory than that relied on by the Office of Disciplinary
Council was of little moment. Since Zauderer was put on notice of the charges against him, and
was given an opportunity to respond to the Board's recommendations, the Court held that the
demands of procedural due process were satisfied. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2283-84 (1985).
1985-86]
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workable framework for scrutinizing state restrictions on advertising
and solicitation by attorneys. The Supreme Court has cited Bigelow v.
Virginia1 as its first expression of "dissatisfaction with the then-preva-
lent approach of resolving a class of first amendment claims simply by
categorizing the speech as 'commercial.' " The Court in Bigelow
stated that, "[regardless of the particular label . . .- whether [the
state] calls speech 'commercial' or 'commercial advertising' or 'solicita-
tion'-a court may not escape the task of assessing the first amendment
interest at stake and weighing it against the public interest allegedly
served by the regulation." ' The following term, the Court extinguished
any possibility that a "commercial speech" exception to first amend-
ment protection might still exist. 9 After conceding that some fragment
of hope for a "commercial speech" exception might have persisted be-
cause of the subject matter of the advertisement in Bigelow,20 the opin-
ion in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc."1 concluded that commercial speech, like other
varieties of speech, is constitutionally protected.
22
At the same time the Court directly extended this protection to
commercial speech, it was quick to point out that its decision did not
foreclose any regulation of such speech." As examples of proper state
regulation, the Court mentioned the propriety of properly drawn time,
place, and manner restrictions, and the ability to deal with deceptive or
misleading speech, or speech that concerns illegal activity. 4
16. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
17. Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977).
18. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826.
19. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 760-61 (1976), the Court stated, "the question whether there is a First Amendment excep-
tion for 'commercial speech' is squarely before us."
20. In Bigelow, the Court reversed a conviction for violating a statute that made circulation
of any publication to encourage or promote the processing of an abortion in Virginia a misde-
meanor. While the advertisement at issue offered the services of a referral agency in New York, it
also announced that abortions were legal there. Thus, the advertisement did more than simply
propose a commercial transaction. It contained factual information of public interest.
21. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
22. Id. at 770.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 771-72. Moreover, the Court mentioned that common sense differences between
speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction and other varieties of speech
suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure the free flow of truthful and
legitimate commercial information. The Court noted that since advertising is indispensable to the
realization of commercial profits, commercial speech is less likely than other varieties of speech to
be chilled by proper regulation. Thus, the Court suggested that this greater hardiness, coupled
with the greater objectivity available in analyzing printed advertising, may make it less necessary
to tolerate inaccurate statements and more appropriate to require additional information, warn-
[Vol. 8:281
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These views ultimately crystallized into a four-part test in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.25 The
initial inquiry focuses on whether the speech concerns lawful activity
and is not misleading. 6 If both of these answers are positive, the
speech is entitled to first amendment protection. Next, the state is re-
quired to show a substantial governmental interest. Once this is estab-
lished, a court must determine whether the regulation directly advances
the governmental interest, and, if so, whether it is no more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest.2 7 Thus, while the precise bounds
of commercial speech are somewhat nebulous,28 once the speech is de-
termined to be "commercial" the framework for analysis is clear.
Even prior to the crystallization of the Central Hudson test, the
law regarding attorney advertising and solicitation was forming. In
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,29 the Court invalidated an outright pro-
hibition on attorney advertising and held that a state may not prevent
the truthful advertisement of routine legal services.30 While recognizing
the attorney's advertising as a form of protected commercial speech, 3'
the Court, consistent with other commercial speech cases,"2 carefully
noted that its decision did not foreclose all regulation of attorney adver-
ings, or disclaimers to prevent deception. Id. at 772 n.24.
25. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
26. Id. at 563. "The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the infor-
mational function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the
suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activ-
ity." Id.
27. Id. at 566.
28. In Central Hudson, Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Brennan joined, criticized both
definitions of commercial speech given by the Court. He viewed "expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience" as too broad, possibly reaching speech entitled
to full first amendment protection, albeit economically motivated. The second definition-"speech
proposing a commercial transaction"-he viewed as possibly too narrow, expressing his concern
that this definition may encompass only routine price advertising to the exclusion of other commu-
nications that merely make the name of the product or service more familiar to the public. Id. at
580-81. (Stevens, J., concurring). In Zauderer, Justice White stated, "[m]ore subject to doubt,
perhaps, are the precise bounds of the category of expression that may be termed commercial
speech, but it is clear enough that the speech at issue in this case-advertising pure and sim-
ple-falls within those bounds." Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2275 (1985).
29. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
30. The Court rejected the following justifications alleged by the Arizona bar: (1) The ad-
verse effect on professionalism; (2) the inherently misleading nature of attorney advertising; (3)
the adverse effect on administration of justice; (4) the undesirable economic effects of advertising;
(5) the adverse effect on the quality of legal service; and (6) the difficulties of enforcement. Id. at
368-79.
31. Id. at 383.
32. E.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 770.
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tising.33 The Court in Bates also stated that due to the public's lack of
sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that might be
overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising might be sub-
ject to regulation in the field of attorney advertising. 4 As an example,
the Court noted that claims about the quality of legal service are not
susceptible of measurement or verification.35 "In sum, . . . many of the
problems in defining the boundary between deceptive and non-deceptive
advertising remain to be resolved . "..."36
The states' authority to regulate deceptive attorney advertising
was refined in In re R.M.J.37 A unanimous Supreme Court indicated
that "the Central Hudson formulation must be applied to advertising
for professional services with the understanding that the special charac-
teristics of such services afford opportunities to mislead and confuse
that are not present when standardized products or services are offered
to the public."38 Accordingly, the Court stated:
[W]hen the particular content or method of the advertising suggests
that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in
fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose ap-
propriate restrictions. But the States may not place an absolute prohi-
bition on certain types of potentially misleading information, e.g., a
listing of areas of practice, if the information also may be presented in
a way that is not deceptive.3 9
Since the record before the Court failed to show that the attorney's
advertisements were misleading, the Court invalidated the following re-
strictions: (1) listing fields of practice only by the precise terms pre-
scribed in Missouri's disciplinary rules; 0 (2) prohibiting the listing of
courts and states the attorney is licensed to practice in;" and (3)
33. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84. The Court stated that false, deceptive, or misleading advertis-
ing was subject to restraint and suggested the possibility that warnings or disclaimers might be
justified to insure that the consumer is not misled. Additionally, the Court noted that reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible and that advertising concerning illegal activi-
ties may be supressed. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 383.
36. Id. at 384.
37. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
38. Id. at 203 n.15.
39. Id. at 203.
40. On this point, the Court said "[t]he use of the words 'real estate' instead of 'property'
could scarcely mislead the public." "Indeed, . . .in certain respects appellant's listing is more
informative than that provided in the addendum." Id. at 205.
41. The Court viewed the attorney's listing, in large capital letters, that he was a member of
the Bar of the United States Supreme Court as relatively uninformative and in bad taste. How-
ever, since the lower court made no finding that this rendered the ad misleading, the Court invali-
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prohibiting the practice of mailing cards to the general public announc-
ing the opening of the attorney's office."2 It is important to note that in
R.M.J., the Court viewed the mass mailing as advertising, as opposed
to solicitation.4 3 In the solicitation context, significant state interests
may be present which justify state regulation."
The solicitation issue, not addressed in Bates," was the subject of
two cases decided the same day in 1978, In re Primus" and Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Association.'7 In In re Primus,4" the alleged solicita-
tion took the form of a letter acquainting a woman with the American
Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) offer of free representation. The attor-
ney, an officer and cooperating lawyer with the Columbia, South Caro-
lina branch of the ACLU, had previously discussed with the woman the
possibility of seeking redress for an allegedly unconstitutional steriliza-
tion. The Court found that the attorney's actions "were undertaken to
express personal political beliefs and to advance the civil-liberties
objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive financial gain."' '9 Ac-
cordingly, it reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court's holding that
the attorney could be disciplined under a broad anti-solicitation rule,
rejecting that court's attempt to distinguish NAACP v. Button.60 Given
the presence of constitutionally protected associational freedoms, the
anti-solicitation regulation "must withstand 'the exacting scrutiny ap-
plicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights . . .,.
dated the restriction. The Court also noted that the rule itself failed to identify this information as
potentially misleading or place a limitation on type size or require an explanation of the nature of
the Supreme Court bar. Id. at 205-06.
42. Id. at 206. On this last issue, the Court found no indication of a failed effort to proceed
along a less restrictive path, such as requiring a copy of all general mailings to be filed with the
state so that it may exercise reasonable supervision.
43. The split of authority about whether a given mailing will be treated as impermissible
solicitation or constitutionally protected advertising is documented in Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 866
(1981). However, the majority of decisions can be reconciled in light of the distinctions drawn by
the Supreme Court in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). In Primus, the Court noted the record
did not support a finding of undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, or invasion of pri-
vacy. Id. at 434-35. Neither was there "in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain." Id. at 422.
44. See infra pp. 288-89.
45. 433 U.S. at 384.
46. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
47. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
48. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
49. Id. at 422.
50. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In Button, the solicitation of prospective litigants, including many
non-NAACP members, for the purpose of furthering the civil-rights objectives of the organization
and its members was held to come within the right to engage in association for the advancement
of beliefs and ideas. Id. at 428-30.
51. Primus, at 432 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976)).
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These associational freedoms were not present in the companion case of
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association.51 In Ohralik, the alleged act of
solicitation occurred when the attorney personally approached the vic-
tims of an auto accident, one as she lay in traction in a hospital, and
the other on the day she came home from the hospital. The Ohio Su-
preme Court indefinitely suspended the attorney's license under two
broad anti-solicitation rules.53 The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed this decision, rejecting the attorney's assertion that in-person so-
licitation shared the same first amendment protection as the truthful
advertising of routine legal services upheld in Bates." "While entitled
to some constitutional protection," the Court stated, "appellant's con-
duct is subject to regulation in furtherance of important state inter-
ests."' 55 The Court noted that "[tihe interest of the states in regulating
lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary
government function of administering justice, and have historically
been 'officers of the court.' "" Given the states' legitimate interest in
preventing those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influ-
ence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of vexatious conduct,
the Court upheld the validity of Ohio's prophylactic rules and their
application to the attorney without the necessity of proving actual
harm.57
Both the solicitation and advertising aspects of state regulation of
attorneys were addressed in Eaton & Benton v. Arkansas Supreme
Court Committee on Professional Conduct," the only reported Arkan-
sas decision on these issues. In Eaton, the attorneys had contracted
with Val-Pak Advertising to include an advertisement of their firm in a
mail-out packet featuring discount coupons for local businesses. The
mailing targeted 10,000 households in the North Little Rock area.59
The ad featured several inquiries concerning specific legal services and
concluded with the question "Other legal problems?" The ad also con-
tained the name, address, and phone number of the law firm, stated
that the first consultation charge was only $10.00, and indicated that
52. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
53. The Ohio Supreme Court based its decision on DR 2-103(A), prohibiting self-recommen-
dation, and DR 2-104(A), prohibiting accepting employment from the unsolicited advice that a
client should obtain counsel. The complaint in Zauderer alleged these same violations.
54. 436 U.S. at 455.
55. Id. at 459.
56. Id. at 460 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)).
57. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464.
58. 270 Ark. 573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981).
59. Id. at 576, 607 S.W.2d at 56.
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there was no time or subject limitation. 0 The Arkansas Supreme Court
found "that a combination of the content and the manner of dissemina-
tion in this case constitutes a violation of [the Arkansas disciplinary]
rules." '61 More specifically, the court found the ad violated DR 2-
101(B) for its failure to be informative in nature.6 Since the ad's "pri-
mary purpose was not to inform the consumer to facilitate an informed
choice by allowing fee comparison, but rather to urge a group of spe-
cific potential consumers to seek [the attorneys'] services," it consti-
tuted solicitation.63 In support of this view, the court noted that the
attorneys' contract with Val-Pak provided that no competitors' adver-
tisements would be sent in the same mailing packet without the attor-
neys' permission. 4 The attorneys contended that they could have pro-
duced evidence from satisfied clients and, through cross-examination,
could have shown that this advertisement was not misleading, had they
known the charges in the complaint in more detail." The court re-
sponded by citing Ohralik6 for the proposition that the constitutional
validity of the states' decision to discipline the attorneys under its anti-
solicitation rules does not depend on proof of actual harm. 7 In support
of its finding that the manner of dissemination was also impermissible,
the court noted the ad's inclusion with predominantly discount offers
and that the front of the mailing packet envelope read, "Valuable cou-
pons from local businesses."" Thus, the court concluded that the "ad-
vertisement certainly could be understood by a recipient as appearing
to be a discount offer and a solicitation of legal services."69 The court
concluded the opinion by finding no violation in the application of its
disciplinary rules to the attorneys under the first amendment, nor the
similar provision contained in the Arkansas Constitution. 70 The court
cited Bates and Ohralik as specifically allowing the states to regulate
60. The advertisement is reprinted in Eaton. Id. at 578, 607 S.W.2d at 58.
61. Id. at 581-82, 607 S.W.2d at 60.
62. The court indicated that the last query, "Other legal problems?", coupled with the
phrase, "There is no time or subject limitation," could indicate that these attorneys were compe-
tent to advise and consult on any legal problem. Thus, the court failed to see how this broad
invitation without any indication of charges, was sufficient information to assist one in need of
legal services to make an informed selection. Id. at 580, 607 S.W.2d at 59.
63. Id. at 580-81, 607 S.W.2d at 59.
64. Id. at 581, 607 S.W.2d at 60.
65. Id. at 582, 607 S.W.2d at 60.
66. 436 U.S. 477 (1978).
67. Eaton, 270 Ark. at 582-83, 607 S.W.2d at 60-61.
68. Id. at 580, 607 S.W.2d at 59.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 583, 607 S.W.2d at 61. See also ARK. CoNsT. art. II § 6.
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the time, place, and manner of advertising."
The three distinct holdings of the United States Supreme Court in
Zauderer 2 demonstrated that Bates and Ohralik must be carefully ap-
plied in assessing an attorney's first amendment advertising claims.
First, a five member majority held "[a]n attorney may not be disci-
plined for soliciting legal business through printed advertising contain-
ing truthful and nondeceptive information and advice regarding the le-
gal rights of potential clients. '7'  The Court reached this decision
despite the narrow reading the Ohio Supreme Court had given its
broad prohibitions on self-recommendation and solicitation. The Ohio
court had held only that its rules forbade these activities with reference
to a specific legal problem.
74
The Supreme Court applied the four-part test enunciated in Cen-
tral Hudson: (1) Does the ad concern lawful activity and is it mislead-
ing? (2) Does the state have a substantial interest? (3) Is that interest
directly advanced by the regulation? (4) Is the regulation no more ex-
tensive than necessary to serve the state interest? 75 The Court not only
found the ad was neither false nor deceptive,76 but also that it was
entirely accurate.
77
The Court noted that the ad did not promise the reader that her
lawsuit would be successful, nor did it suggest that Zauderer had any
special expertise other than his current employment in other Dalkon
Shield litigation.78 The ad merely reported the indisputable fact that
the Dalkon Shield had spawned an impressive number of lawsuits.7 9
The Court also noted that advising women not to assume that their
claims were time-barred seemed completely unobjectionable in light of
the trend in may states towards a "discovery rule" for determining
71. Eaton, 270 Ark. 583, 607 S.W.2d 61. The Eaton opinion is criticized in Note, Eaton and
Benton v. Supreme Court of Arkansas Committee on Professional Conduct: Restrictions on Legal
Advertising, 35 ARK. L. REV. 549 (1981). The author also suggest that the ultimate result of the
Eaton decision will be to discourage the use of alternative methods of advertising, which may be
more economically feasible and more efficient in reaching those in need of legal services, to the
public's detriment.
72. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
73. Id. at 2280.
74. Disciplinary Counsel v. Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d 44, 48, 461 N.E.2d 883, 887 (1984).
See also Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2276.
75. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. See also supra notes 22-24 and accompanying
text.







when a cause of action for latent injury or disease accrues. 80 Thus, the
Court stated that "[t]he State's power to prohibit advertising that is
'inherently misleading' . . . cannot justify Ohio's decision to discipline
[Zauderer] for running advertising geared to persons with a specific
legal problem."81
After determining that the first part of the Central Hudson test
was satisfied, the Court put the burden on the state to establish that
prohibiting the use of statements directed at a specific legal problem to
solicit or obtain business directly advanced a substantial state inter-
est.82 The Court first noted that the extensive citations in the Board of
Commissioners' opinion to the Ohralik case suggested that the Board
believed the application of Ohio's rules served the same interests held
to justify the ban on in-person solicitation at issue in Ohralik 3 The
Supreme Court, however, found that the concerns that moved the
Court in Ohralik were not present.8 It emphasized that the Ohralik
decision was based largely on the differences between face-to-face solic-
itation-"a practice rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of
privacy, exercise of undue influence, and outright fraud"-and the ad-
vertising upheld in Bates.88 While recognizing that some "sensitive
souls" may have found Zauderer's ad in poor taste, the Court rejected
any suggestion that it would amount to an invasion of privacy.86 More
significant to the Court in distinguishing Ohralik was the lack of coer-
cive force and pressure on the client to make an immediate response to
a printed publication. 7 Since printed advertising is more conducive to
reflection and the exercise of personal choice by the consumer than in-
person solicitation, Ohralik could not justify disciplining Zauderer for
80. Id. at 2276-77. The Court noted that,
[i]n 1983, the Ohio Supreme Court explicitly adopted the rule that "[w]hen an injury
does not manifest itself immediately, the cause of action arises upon the date on which
the plaintiff is informed by competent medical authority that he has been injured, or
upon the date on which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, he should have become
aware that he has been injured, whichever comes first."
Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2277 n. I1 (quoting O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St. 3d 84, 90,
447 N.E.2d 727, 732 (1983)).
8 1. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2277. The court cited In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203, as authority
for the states' ability to prohibit advertising that is inherently misleading.
82. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2277.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. The Court stated that in Ohralik it was "careful to point out that 'in-person solicita-
tion ...does not stand on a par with truthful advertising about the availability and terms of
routine legal services.'" Id. (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455).




the content of his ad. 88
The Court next addressed what it called "the traditional justifica-
tion" for restraints on solicitation, i.e., "the fear that lawyers will 'stir
up litigation' ,,:89
That our citizens have access to their civil courts is not an evil to be
regretted; rather, it is an attribute of our system of justice in which
we ought to take pride. The State is not entitled to interfere with that
access by denying its citizens accurate information about their legal
rights.90
Thus, even if Zauderer's truthful and nondeceptive advertisement in
fact encouraged other consumers to file lawsuits, it could not justify
disciplining Zauderer. 91
Next the Court addressed the state's position that the regulatory
difficulties inherent in legal advertising made a prophylactic rule neces-
sary. The state argued that the indeterminacy of legal statements dis-
tinguished them from statements about most consumer products since
the latter are more easily subject to verification. Accordingly, the state
argued that the nonfeasibility of weeding out the accurate from the
false or misleading statements made a prophylactic rule essential in or-
der to vindicate the state's substantial interest in ensuring that its citi-
zens are not encouraged to litigate by ambiguous or outright false in-
formation. 92 The Court noted, however, that the application of a
prophylactic rule to Zauderer, notwithstanding that his advertisement
contained none of the vices allegedly justifying the anti-solicitation
rule, conflicted with the requirement that restrictions on commercial
speech be narrowly drawn to serve the state's purposes. 93 Nevertheless,
the Court chose not to decide this issue since it was not convinced that
the state's rule was necessary to achieve a substantial government in-
terest." The Court was unpersuaded that the problems of distinguish-
ing deceptive from nondeceptive legal advertising were different in kind
from those involved in distinguishing between deceptive and nondecep-
tive advertising generally.9" Accordingly, the Court expressed its con-
88. Id.
89. Id.




94. Id. at 2278-79.
95. Id. at 2279. The Court felt that the facts of the case undercut this argument since
Zauderer's advertisement was easily verifiable and completely accurate. Furthermore, the Court
pointed out that the body of case law that has developed as a result of the Federal Trade Commis-
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tinued faith that the free flow of commercial information was impor-
tant enough to justify the costs of regulating it."
Justice O'Connor, in an opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist and
Chief Justice Burger, dissented on this point and expressed the view
that "the use of unsolicited legal advice to entice clients poses enough
of a risk of overreaching and undue influence to warrant Ohio's [anti-
solicitation] rule." 97 Justice O'Connor advanced a number of justifica-
tions for this view. First, she noted the enhanced possibility for confu-
sion and deception in marketing legal services and suggested that state
regulation was therefore entitled to greater deference than permitted
by the majority's analysis. 9" Second, and more significantly in her view,
Justice O'Connor felt that the attorney's personal, pecuniary interest
may color the advice offered in soliciting the client. Thus, she reasoned,
the consumer's decision to employ an attorney may be based on advice
that is neither complete nor disinterested. 9 Consistent with this view,
Justice O'Connor's opinion cited the substantial state interest in requir-
ing that lawyers consistently exercise independent professional judg-
ment. 100 Although O'Connor's opinion clearly articulated the states' le-
gitimate interests, it did not purport to show how the regulation
directly advanced these interests, °10 and even conceded that it would
not require that the least restrictive means be employed."0 '
The Court next held that Zauderer could not be disciplined for
using an accurate and nondeceptive illustration in his advertisement. 10
Even the O'Connor opinion concurred on this point, expressing the view
sion's mandate to eliminate unfair or deceptive practices in commerce tended to show that com-
plex and technical factual issues can be present in many advertisements. Id.
96. Id. at 2279-80.
97. Id. at 2294.
98. Id. at 2294-95. The opinion noted repeated acknowledgements by the Court in commer-
cial speech cases that the differences between professional services and other advertised products
may justify distinctive state regulation. Id. (citing Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 773 n.25).
See also Virginia Pharmacy Bd., at 773-775 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84;
R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 204 n.15.
99. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2294.
100. Id. at 2296.
101. The dissent disagreed that the anti-solicitation provision in DR 2-104(A) was "unneces-
sary" to achieve the state's interests, but stated only that the rule was "appropriate" to assure the
exercise of independent professional judgment. The state could "reasonably" determine that unso-
licited advice could be used as bait to obtain an agreement to represent a client for a fee. Id. at
2296-97.
102. "The Ohio rule may sweep in some advertisements containing helpful legal advice
within its general prohibition. Nevertheless, I am not prepared to second-guess Ohio's longstand-
ing and careful balancing of legitimate state interests merely because appellant here can invent a
less restrictive rule." Id. at 2297.
103. Id. at 2281.
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that, at least in the context of print media, the task of monitoring illus-
trations in attorney advertising is not so unmanageable as to warrant
Ohio's prophylactic rule. 10' The majority opinion found that the appli-
cation of DR 2-101(B)'s ban on illustrations to Zauderer's ad was inva-
lid for many of the same reasons that application of the self-recommen-
dation and solicitation rules were invalid. 106 Noting the important
communicative functions illustrations serve, the Court also scrutinized
this restriction under the Central Hudson test.10 6 The illustration was
an accurate representation of the Dalkon Shield,107 and the Court per-
ceived no deceiving, misleading, or confusing features. 108 Thus, the ma-
jority opinion put the burden on the state to present a substantial gov-
ernment interest justifying DR 2-101 (B)'s application to Zauderer, and
to demonstrate that the Rule's ban on illustrations vindicates that in-
terest through the least restrictive available means. 109 The Court noted
that the rule itself suggested that it served to ensure that attorneys
advertise in a dignified manner.110 Since no suggestion was made that
Zauderer's ad was undignified, the Court failed to see how its applica-
tion in this case directly advanced the state's interest in preserving the
dignity of attorneys.1
The state again argued that only a prophylactic rule would serve
its purpose of preventing the public from being misled, manipulated, or
confused. 1 2 It argued that the advertiser is skilled in the use of illus-
trations, which may operate at a subconscious level. Thus, the state
would be hard pressed to point to any particular illustration and prove
that it was misleading or manipulative.13 The Court was not con-
vinced. It noted that the state failed to cite any evidence or authority to
prove that the potential abuses associated with the use of illustrations
104. Id. at 2294. The Court specifically reserved questions involving "'the special problems
of advertising on the electronic broadcast media .... .' " Id. n.1 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 384).
105. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2280.
106. Id.
107. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Ohio stipulated that the illustration was accurate.
Id. at 2276.
108. Id. at 2280.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The majority opinion expressed doubt about whether the state's desire that attorneys
maintain dignity in their communications with the public, as opposed to decorum in the court-
room, was substantial enough to justify the abridgement of their first amendment rights. But even
assuming that was the case, the majority was unpersuaded that undignified behavior would occur
so often as to warrant a prophylactic rule. id.




in attorney ads could not be combatted without imposing a blanket
ban.114 The Court also noted that since decisions regarding the use of
legal services are not likely to be based on qualities that can be visually
represented, illustrations in lawyers' advertisements will be less likely
to lend themselves to material misrepresentations than illustrations in
other forms of advertising.'16 Thus, the Court would not allow the state
to forego the task of monitoring visual representations in favor of the
more convenient, but far more restrictive, alternative of a blanket
ban."
16
The third and final issue regarding state regulation of attorney ad-
vertising the Court addressed was the decision to discipline Zauderer
for his failure to disclose in his ad that clients might be liable for costs,
as opposed to legal fees, even if their litigation proved unsuccessful. On
this point, the Court affirmed the Ohio decision." 7 The Court noted
that the extension of first amendment protection to commercial speech
is principally justified by the value to consumers such commercial in-
formation provides. 1" 8 Thus, it found Zauderer's constitutionally pro-
tected interest in not providing any particular information in his adver-
tising to be minimal." 9 The Court noted that since disclosure
requirements trench much more narrowly on free speech than outright
prohibitions, its commercial speech decisions have emphasized that
warnings or disclaimers might be appropriately required to protect con-
sumers from confusion or deception. 20 But the Court also recognized
that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might
chill protected commercial speech.' 21 Balancing these interests, the
Court arrived at a test for disclosure requirements. "[A]n advertiser's
rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of
114. Id. at 2281.
115. Id.
116. Id. Again the Court pointed to the experience of the F.T.C., this time to show that the
elimination of deceptive uses of the visual media has not proven to be an insurmountable task. Id.
117. Id. at 2283.
118. Id. at 2282.
119. Id. The Court distinguished its decisions holding that compulsion to speak may be as
violative of the first amendment as outright prohibitions on speech. It reasoned that interests are
at stake in pure speech cases that are not present in commercial speech cases. See, e.g., Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1975) (Jehovah Witnesses' conviction for knowingly obscuring on his
license plate the state motto, "Live Free or Die," reversed); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (Florida statute requiring newspaper editors to grant political can-
didates equal space to reply to criticism and attacks on their character by newspapers held
unconstitutional).
120. 105 S. Ct. at 2282 (citing R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 201).
121. 105 S. Ct. at 2282.
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consumers." 12 2 Since Zauderer's ad made no mention of the distinction
between "legal fees" and "costs," the Court found that the ad would
suggest a no-lose proposition to a layman not accustomed to the techni-
cal legal meaning of these words. 123 Thus, the Court found a reasona-
ble relationship to the state's interest by this "self-evident" possibility
of deception.'
24
The majority's analysis on the disclosure issue troubled Justices
Brennan and Marshall, who dissented from this holding.1 25 In an opin-
ion written by Justice Brennan, they expressed the view that disclosure
requirements are "reasonably related" only if they fully comply with
the four-part Central Hudson test.128 Finding this approach more con-
sistent with past decisions, Justices Brennan and Marshall would re-
quire the state to demonstrate a legitimate and substantial state inter-
est that is directly advanced by the regulation and no broader than
necessary to prevent the deception . 2 These two Justices, however,
were unconvinced that this standard was met by the record before
them. 128 They pointed out that the failure of an attorney advertising his
availability on a contingent-fee basis to publish his rates was not "in-
herently likely to deceive," nor did the record reveal any actual proof of
deception. 29 They also noted that the Ohio decision found unethical
conduct in Zauderer's failure to fully disclose the terms of the contin-
gent fee arrangements.13 0 Since the record indicated that Zauderer en-
tered into a comprehensive contract with personal injury clients, Justice
Brennan stated that requiring full disclosure would obviously fit the
majority's definition of an "unduly burdensome requirement" that
would violate the first amendment. 31
The significance of Zauderer lies in the guidelines it has given to
both the practicing attorney and the states in this evolving area of the
law. The four-part Central Hudson test is the standard for scrutinizing
attorney solicitation through printed advertisements containing infor-
mation, advice on specific legal issues, or illustrations.'82 The blanket
122. Id. The Court also rejected the suggestion that the disclosure requirements were unduly
burdensome. Id. at 2283 n.15.
123. Id. at 2283.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2285 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
126. Id. at 2285-86.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2285.
129. Id. at 2287 (quoting R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202).
130. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2287-88 (Brennnan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
131. Id. at 2288.
132. R.M.J. indicated that the Central Hudson formulation must be applied to advertising
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bans on solicitation contained in virtually all states' disciplinary rules
have not been declared to be unconstitutional per se.183 However, their
application to specific forms of nondeceptive advertising will probably
be upheld only in situations involving possibilities for overreaching, in-
vasion of privacy, and the exercise of undue influence, which justified
their application to in-person solicitation in Ohralik. T3 However, note
that Justice O'Connor, also expressing the views of Justice Rehnquist
and Chief Justice Burger, would uphold merely "reasonable" or "ap-
propriate" regulation of attorney solicitation. 13 5
More subject to refinement, perhaps, is the Court's standard for
analyzing the validity of disclosure requirements in attorney advertis-
ing. Six members of the Court would "hold that an advertiser's rights
are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reason-
ably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consum-
ers."136 The majority's concession that unjustified or unduly burden-
some disclosure requirements might offend the first amendment by
chilling commercial speech 137 presumably refines what is "reasonable."
This concession somewhat coincides with the insistence of Justices
Brennan and Marshall that all parts of the Central Hudson test be
satisfied.13 8 Under Justice Brennan's analysis, an unjustified or unduly
burdensome restriction, even if pursuant to a substantial state interest,
is not likely to be the least restrictive available means of regulation.
But since a majority of the Court explicitly rejected the use of a "least
restrictive means" analysis, it is likely that state disclosure require-
ments will be upheld unless a litigant can show that the restriction is
for professional services. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203 n.15. Moreover, in Zauderer, the Court stated
that application of the Central Hudson factors led to the conclusion in Bates that truthful price
advertising of routine legal services was permissible, although Bates itself was decided three years
before the Central Hudson test crystallized. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2275.
133. In Zauderer, the Court stated, "[w]e need not, however, address the theoretical ques-
tion whether a prophylactic rule is ever permissible in this area. ... 105 S. Ct. at 2278. The
Court did state, however, that such a rule was "in tension" with its requirement that restrictions
on commercial speech that is not deceptive be narrowly drawn to serve the state's purposes. The
Court also noted that in R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203, it went so far as to state that "the states may
not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information . . . if the
information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive." 105 S. Ct. at 2278.
134. See Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2277-80. But cf. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 434 (showing of
potential, but not actual harm, will not justify application of a prophylactic anti-solicitation rule if
freedoms of expression and association are present).
135. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
136. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2282.
137. Id.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25. Justice Brennan insists that this line of
analysis is most consistent with prior commercial speech decisions.
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not justified or is unduly burdensome:
The Zauderer opinion also indicates that some of the language in
the Arkansas case of Eaton v. Supreme Court of Arkansas Committee
on Professional Conduct' s9 is dead law. The Arkansas Supreme Court
cited Ohralik for the proposition that application of a prophylactic
anti-solicitation rule was warranted without proof of actual harm, al-
though it conceded that the case did not involve in-person solicita-
tion. 140 Noting important distinctions between in-person solicitation
and advertising through the print media, the Supreme Court in
Zauderer would not allow the states to forego the task of monitoring
printed advertising in favor of the far more restrictive ban on solicita-
tion.1 4 ' Thus, advertising by mail in Arkansas has been afforded
greater protection than a reading of the Eaton case would suggest.
The Zauderer case did not, however, completely overrule Eaton.
Implicit in the Eaton court's decision that a combination of the content
and manner of dissemination violated Arkansas' disciplinary rules was
the finding that the ad was misleading.142 The United States Supreme
Court has often recognized the authority of the states to prevent the
dissemination of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or
misleading."
14
In Eaton, the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted DR 2-101(B)
to require that attorney advertising be informative in nature.144 Such a
restriction is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's state-
ment that "the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial
speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the informa-
139. 270 Ark. 573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996 (1981).
140. Id. at 582-83, 607 S.W.2d at 60-61. One casenote suggests that Ohralik was misapplied
and that the Val-Pak advertisement in Eaton offended the Arkansas court's notions of tradition.
See Note, supra note 69, at 44.
141. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2279. More directly on point, in R.M.J., the Court, in response
to the Missouri Supreme Court's decision to discipline an attorney for sending mailing cards to
the general public, suggested the less restrictive means of requiring that a copy of such advertising
be filed with the state. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206. It also noted that Rule 7.2(b) of the proposed
Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association requires that "[a] copy or
recording of an advertisement or written communication shall be kept for one year after its dis-
semination." R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206 n.19.
142. With regard to content, the Arkansas Supreme Court felt the ad's last query, "Other
legal problems?", could indicate to the lay person that the attorneys were competent to consult
and advise on any legal problem. With regard to the manner of dissemination, the court felt the
inclusion of the ad with discount coupons for local business could be understood as a discount
offer. Eaton, 270 Ark. at 580, 607 S.W.2d at 59.
143. See. e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979).
144. Eaton, 270 Ark. at 580, 607 S.W.2d at 59.
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tion such speech provides . *...'"" Although an "informative" re-
quirement directly advances the state's interest in ensuring informed
selection of lawyers, state-imposed disclosure requirements are a less
restrictive means to serve this interest than prohibiting accurate yet un-
informative advertising.
One other aspect of Zauderer's impact on the Eaton case deserves
mention. The dissemination of the attorney's ad in a Val-Pak mailing
packet may infringe upon the state's interest in preserving the dignity
of attorneys. In Zauderer, the Court recognized the state had a sub-
stantial interest in ensuring that its attorneys behave with dignity and
decorum in the courtroom, but was unsure whether the states had a
substantial interest in requiring attorneys to maintain dignity in their
communications with the public. 4 The Supreme Court was unper-
suaded that undignified behavior would occur so often as to warrant a
prophylactic rule.1 47 However, the Court was not presented with a situ-
ation in which the manner of dissemination itself could be viewed as
downgrading the profession.' 48 Perhaps the fact situation presented in
Eaton would lead the Court to conclude that the state's interest in
preventing such advertising is substantial. However, arguments can also
be made that the benefits of accurate and informative advertising far
outweigh any adverse inferences that may be drawn from the manner
in which it is received. Whether the continued use of advertising by
attorneys will require the recognition of this state interest as substantial
must await future litigation.
Daniel L. Parker
145. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2282 (citing Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
146. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2280.
147. Id.
148. In Zauderer, the attorney was expressly authorized by Ohio DR 2-101(B) to place his
ad in a regularly published newspaper, which he did.
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